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The causes of the poor white problem, first noted at a Dutch Reformed Church Synod in 
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amongst the factors said to be the causes of poverty. This paper assesses the similarities 
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Although white poverty was not unheard of during the first two centuries of white colonialisation in South 
Africa (Coetzee, 1942:23), the severe poverty of the white poor became much more evident by the 1880s 
(Terreblanche, 2002:266). Fifty years later, by the early 1930s, eradicating white poverty became a social, 
economic and political objective. In an attempt to address the problem, the Carnegie Commission of 1932 
investigated the causes, consequences and corrective measures of the poor white phenomenon. 3 In part 
due to these and earlier policies and to other factors and events discussed in this paper, the problem of 
white poverty was solved four decades later. 
 
More than seven decades later South Africa still struggles with poverty. By 2000, close to half the black 
population could be considered poor. Black poverty has regained prominence in government circles as a 
key policy concern since the democratic elections of 1994. Yet, the task of alleviating black poverty seems 
insurmountable. 
 
The  rationale  for  comparing  white  poverty  in  the  1930s  with  black  poverty  today  is  based  on  the 
knowledge that white poverty of the 1930s had mostly been alleviated by the 1970s or even earlier.4 The 
current South African government aims to make black poverty history. Although the two periods are 
similar in a number of respects, there are also distinct differences. Caution is advised when dealing with 
this part of South Africa’s history; making strong judgments and claiming hard evidence usually lead to a 
subjective and incomplete assessment. To compare two periods as different as this, only “soft” judgments 
and recommendations suffice. 
 
A  comparison  between  white  poverty  in  the  1930s  and  black  poverty  today  reveals  striking  policy 
similarities. The causes of poverty in each era show many overlaps. Drawing from historical experience 
and  knowledge  regarding  these,  this  study  hopes  to  add  to  the  existing  debate  on  possible  policy 
recommendations for alleviating black poverty today. 
 
WHITE POVERTY A CENTURY AGO 
 
The poor white problem mostly spans the first four decades of the 20th century. At a synod of the Dutch-
Reformed Church in 1886, a conference was called for to investigate the problem of poor whites. The first 
conference, held in 1893 at Stellenbosch, was followed by similar conferences in 1916 (Cradock), 1923 
(Bloemfontein),  1930  (Pretoria)  and  in  1933  (Bloemfontein).  The  first  Congress  of  the  People 
(Volkskongres)  in  1934  was  entirely  dedicated  to  investigating  the  poor  white  problem  (the 
armblankevraagstuk). 
 
Although the magnitude of the poor white problem is a much debated issue, most early estimates suggest 
a rapid increase in the numbers of poor whites over the first three decades of the twentieth century. 
According to Lewis (1973:7), the Transvaal Indigency Commission (1906-1908) gave no comprehensive 
poor white statistics and “found it difficult to form any accurate estimate even of the number of urban 
poor whites”. The first official numbers to appear were those announced by H.C. van Heerden, Minister 
of Agriculture, at a conference convened by the Dutch Reformed Church at Cradock in 1916 (Table 1). 
 
  Numbers  Per cent of population 
Ultra-poor  39021  3.06% 
Poor  67497  5.29% 
Total  106518  8.35% 
Table 1: Numbers of poor whites 
Source: Botha, L (1956:159) 
                                                 
3 In 1927 the president and secretary of the Carnegie Corporation in New York visited South Africa where the need 
was identified to investigate the situation of the poor white (Grosskopf, Book I, 1932:i). The Report of the Carnegie 
Commission was published in 1932.  
4 Black poverty in the 1930s was much more severe than white poverty. Terreblanche (2002:393) estimates that 
whites’ per capita income was approximately 11 times larger than that of blacks in 1917 and about 13 times larger in 
1936. However, for the purposes of this paper, only poverty in the white population group is considered. There are, 
of course, various reasons why black poverty was historically judged to be unimportant or received less economic, 
social and political attention. See Le Roux (1984) for a thorough analysis of the topic.  
Although  these  numbers  remained  in  official  use5,  Grosskopf  (Book  I,  1932:20)  argues  that  these 
estimates are unreliable, as each interviewee used different standards for identifying the “poor” and “ultra-
poor”. According to Lewis (1973:8), the general difficulty with estimates of poor white statistics is that a 
subjective element always enters into such estimates. 
 
Probably  the  most  reliable  estimate  of  the  magnitude  of  the  poor  white  problem  was  made  by  the 
Carnegie Commission of 1932. Questionnaires sent out to almost half the schools in the country asked 
principals to indicate how many children came from “very poor” families. The returned questionnaires 
indicated that about 17.5% of the 49434 families were “very poor”. According to Grosskopf (Book I, 
1932:vii), if the 17.5% is extrapolated to the total white population of 1 800 000, then a “conservative 
estimate” of the extent of severe poverty would be around 300 000 individuals. The Commission adds 
that the questionnaires were completed during 1929-1930, before the effects of the depression became 
evident. To check this number, the Commission counted the number of white males over 15 working as 
shepherds, foresters and woodmen, bywoners, labourers on the railways, labourers in general, unskilled 
industrial workers, transport riders and diggers in the 1926 census. Assuming that the share of jobs 
remained the same for the next five years, they concluded that this represented a population group of 
more than 220 000. Although not all of the individuals in these job descriptions would be poor, the 
Commission argued that the numbers of individuals living in poverty would likely be larger once farmers 
(totaling more than 100 000) were considered, as many farmers were considered to be poor (Grosskopf, 
Book I, 1932:vii). According to Lewis (1973:9), it was not possible for the Commission to cement their 
poor white farmer claim until 1941, when the cash incomes of farmers were first enumerated for census 
purposes. 
 
However, some commentators have since argued that the poor white problem was never as severe as once 
was thought. According to Le Roux (1984:3), the estimates of the many investigations are “totally off the 
mark”. He argues that the poor white problem was much more a case of rural poverty, having existed all 
along, being brought into the open (Le Roux, 1984:3). Grosskopf (Book I, 1932:8) agrees to some extent: 
“There are many indications that the rural poor did not actually grow poorer, but rather by comparison 
with other groups, and that on this account many of them left the farms of their own choice to look for 
better chances”. 
 
Such arguments seem to undermine the established reasoning that the poor white problem manifested as a 
sudden increase in the numbers of poor whites. Although the size of the white population did increase, in 
large part the rise in white poverty was due to an increase in relative poverty; as other whites were growing 
richer, a lower class of whites was left behind by the rapid increases in income and wealth experienced by 
the middle and upper classes, and therefore joined the ranks of the poor whites. 
 
BLACK POVERTY TODAY6 
 
Since the arrival of whites in the interior of the country, an unequal society developed in which the 
majority of the poor were black, rural and unemployed. Although black wages began to rise in the 1970s, 
by the beginning of the 1990s, close to half of the black population still subsisted below the poverty line. 
With the advent of the new democracy in 1994, eradicating black poverty came to the fore as the primary 
policy objective of the ANC government. The new government was tasked with the responsibility of 
alleviating poverty within the context of an economy that had been stagnating, mostly as a result of the 
economic sanctions imposed against South Africa because of its Apartheid-policy. The RDP and GEAR 
were two early government programmes designed to promote economic growth and target key areas to 
alleviate  poverty.  Various  other  policy  documents,  reports  and  conferences  have  since  addressed  the 
problem of black poverty on a more micro-level. Most recently, ASGI-SA, the government’s Accelerated 
and Shared Growth Initiative, attempts to reach a 6 per cent growth target by targeting the country’s 
binding constraints - infrastructure and human capital - and through this achieving poverty reduction. 
 
Yet, black poverty remains a serious problem. By 2000, according to Van der Berg and Louw (2004:567), 
44 per cent of the black population could still be considered poor. 
                                                 
5 H.C. van Heerden in the Union Year Book of 1933/34: “For all practical purposes this (the numbers of 1916) still 
remains the basis of current estimates”. 
6 Blacks here exclude coloureds and Indians.  
  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Number of blacks 
in poverty  10397430  9761669  10427844  12003438  13026970  15311490  16400691 
Per cent of blacks 
in poverty  64.60%  52.90%  49.30%  49.10%  45.90%  48.40%  47.40% 
 
Table 2: Estimates of poverty headcount and poverty headcount ratio for blacks, selected years from 1970 to 2000 
Source: Van der Berg and Louw (2004) 
 
  1975  1993  1995  1996  2000 
Gini-coefficient for blacks  0.49  0.56  0.57  0.68  0.59 
Table 3: Gini coefficients estimated from various surveys for blacks’ intra-group distribution 
Source: Van der Berg and Louw (2004) 
 
The evidence provided in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that, although the black poor as a percentage of the total 
black  population  declined  between  1995  and  2000,  absolute  poverty  increased  while  the  inequality 
between the more affluent black population and the black poor also widened. Van der Berg and Louw 
(2004:568) estimate what the path of poverty might have been had the Gini-coefficient remained the same 
for the black population between 1970 and 2000. They find that aggregate poverty would have declined 
from 49.8 per cent in 1970 to 26.5 per cent, rather than the actual 38.6 per cent observed in 2000. 
Although the share of poor blacks did decrease in the three decades before 2000, it seemed to have come 




Comparing white poverty of the 1930s with black poverty today is an ambitious undertaking. Not only is 
the economic, social and political landscape different today, but the tools and techniques used for poverty 
analysis have also changed considerably since the 1930s. The poor statistical records of the 1930s render 
comparative analysis difficult. Still, in an attempt to draw conclusions about 1930 policies and make 
recommendations for today, comparing the nature and extent of the two experiences of poverty is of 
critical importance. 
 
Using data found in the Wilcocks-report to the Carnegie Commission and drawing on the AMPS 2000 
data set, Table 4 provides a comparison of white poverty in the 1930 and black poverty in 2000. The 
Wilcocks-report in the Carnegie Commission (Book II, 1932:66) lists the annual income of poor white 
families in the district of the former Natal. The original estimates were provided by the Department of 
Public Education in Natal, which conducted a thorough investigation of each applicant to an educational 
aid programme.7 The applicant families were separated into four classes – those earning less than £25 
(Class 1), those earning between £26 and £50 (Class 2), those earning between £51 and £75 (Class 3), and 
those earning between £76 and £100 (Class 4)8. These poverty lines are then inflated to 2000 levels where 
a poverty line of R3571 for Class 1, R7143 for Class 2, R10714 for Class 3 and R14286 for Class 4 is 
estimated. Class 1 in the AMPS data set, therefore, represents the proportion of blacks below R3571 in 
the population of blacks below R14286. The other classes are estimated in a similar way. This provides 
comparable percentages between white and black poverty. The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Carnegie Class 1 
(R3571) 
Carnegie Class 2 
(R7143) 
Carnegie Class 3 
(R10714) 
                                                 
7 This study therefore assumes that white poverty in Natal was a good reflection of white poverty in all four former 
provinces. Although this is not entirely true, as the diamond and gold mines located in the interior attracted large 
numbers of immigrants and settlers - many of whom ended up impoverished, poverty in the interior could not have 
been significantly different. According to Grosskopf (Book I, 1932:58), the ratio of rural to total whites in Natal were 
similar to that in Transvaal in 1911 and 1921, but decreased sharply between 1921 and 1931 as poor white farmers 
moved  to  the  cities  in  Transvaal.  Although  the  absolute  numbers  of  whites  in  the  two  provinces  differed 
considerably, this should have little impact on the percentage of poor used in this analysis. Therefore, although white 
poverty levels from the Natal estimates could be expected to have a slight downward bias, this bias should not 
change the general findings of the study. 
8 Although the income is only reported per family, a constant family size is assumed over each of the four classes. Poor Whites (Carnegie 1932)  19.35%  60.22%  83.33% 
Blacks (AMPS 2000)  59.32%  84.41%  94.74% 
Table 4: Comparison between the white poor in 1930 and black poverty in 2000 
Source: Wilcocks (1932) and AMPS (2000) 
 
The evidence suggests that amongst the poor, black poverty is much more severe than white poverty in 
the 1930s, even given the limitations of the data. This is similar to the poverty gap analysis, with the depth 
of  poverty  (the  poverty  gap)  rather  than  only  the  poverty  headcount  being  compared.  While 
approximately 20 per cent of poor white families interviewed (therefore, those earning less than R14286 in 
2000 prices) fell below the Class 1 poverty line, nearly 60 per cent of blacks that earn less than R14286 in 
2000 could be considered members of Class 1. Although the gap is smaller at the Class 2 and Class 3 
poverty lines, the magnitude of the ultra-poor black subpopulation is still much larger than the extent of 
white poverty in the 1930s. Inference about the white income distribution above R14286 in 2000 prices is 
not possible because interviews with white families were only recorded if these families earned less than 
that amount annually. However, it is possible to conclude that the distribution of income for poor blacks 
in 2000 lies well to the left of the distribution of income for poor whites at the start of the 1930s. 
 
Relative poverty refers to the inequality between different groups. It is thought that inequality within the 
white group increased gradually after the discovery of minerals in the interior of the country, although 
there is little evidence to back this claim. The increase in inequality created an underclass that brought the 
poor white problem into the open. Table 5 compares the percentage income shares of whites on the one 
hand and blacks, coloureds and Indians on the other over the period 1917 to 1967. It is clear from the 
graph that blacks were historically regarded as relatively poor, even though within-black inequality may 
have been low9. 
 
  White 
Blacks, coloureds 
and Indians 
1917/18  71.9%  28.1% 
1924/25  75.2%  24.8% 
1936  74.5%  25.5% 
1939/40  72.0%  28.0% 
1946/47  74.3%  25.7% 
1956/57  74.0%  26.0% 
1959/60  69.3%  30.7% 
1960  76.5%  23.5% 
1967  73.4%  26.6% 
Average  73.5%  26.5% 
Table 5: Percentage shares of income for whites and blacks, 1917 to 1967 
Source: McGrath (1983:123) 
 
The poor white problem was due both to an increase in relative poverty of the white population and to an 
increase in absolute poverty. Black poverty has been subject to comparison with whites for centuries. Yet, 
absolute black poverty today is far more severe than the absolute poverty of whites in the 1930s, which 




Before analysing the causes of poverty in the two periods, an historical overview of economic growth that 
preceded and followed the poor white problem and black poverty today is necessary. However, assessing 
South Africa’s economic growth performance in the period before 1930 is made difficult by the scant 
statistical information available. Schumann (1934) states that economic growth in the period 1910 to 1913 
was relatively high, but was followed by a slow-down and recession by the end of 1915 (Fedderke and 
Simkins, 2006). From 1916 to the mid-1920s, economic growth was mediocre with an increase towards 
the end of the 1920s. 
 
                                                 
9 It is only after 1994 and the arrival of a growing black middleclass, that within-black inequality has increased. Figure 1 shows the economic growth rates for South Africa since 1926. Real gross domestic product using 
factor incomes, published in South African Statistics (1982), were used for the period 1926 to 1946. From 
1947 to 2005 real gross domestic product at market prices were used as published by the South African 










































































































































































Figure 1: Economic growth rates for South Africa between 1926 and 2005 
Source: South African Statistics (1982) and South African Reserve Bank (2006) 
 
The Great Depression and South Africa’s persistence in maintaining the gold standard caused the rapid 
decline in economic growth rates in the early 1930s. However, as soon as South Africa left the gold 
standard at the end of 1932, the effect on the economy was immediate – the gold price increased from 
£4.31 in 1932 to £7.10 in 1937 which contributed to massive economic growth rates in this period 
(Fedderke and Simkins, 2006). Figure 1 shows the high economic growth rates since 1933; the average 
growth rate for the four decades between 1933 and 1973 was 5.51 per cent per annum. 
 
Growth slowed down during the 1970’s and stagnated during the 1980s and early 1990s, fluctuating 
rapidly between boom periods and times of negative growth. The average annual growth rate for 1974 to 
1994 was a mere 1.91 per cent. Since 1994 growth has picked up, although relatively slowly. Growth 
between 1995 and 2005 has averaged at 3.26 per cent per annum. 
 
CAUSES OF POVERTY 
 
A number of causes have been suggested for the observed increase in white poverty at the start of the 
previous century. Poor whites tended to find scapegoats for their situation and thereby implicated the 
“capitalists, the Jews, the locusts and the droughts” (Lewis, 1973:10). Later explanations for the poor 
white problem, including those contained in Afrikaner nationalist propaganda, tended to blame exogenous 
factors, such as the colonial exploitation of the British, the Anglo-Boer war, the rinderpest of 1896-97 or 
cheap imports of maize from the American South. Although these factors did contribute to white poverty, 
the poor white problem - as is the case for black poverty today - developed due to a multitude of different 
factors, both exogenous and endogenous. Growing poverty is not a sudden event; Pelzer (1937:4) noted in 
1937  the  importance  of  a  long-term  perspective  in  investigating  the  determinants  of  the  poor  white 
problem.  Historical  factors,  educational  attainment,  labour  policies,  environmental  and  demographic 
changes, language, culture and political development all shaped a society that experienced an increase in 
absolute poverty but an even sharper increase in inequality. 
 Similar to the poor white problem, black poverty today has been explained as the result of various factors. 
Apartheid-policy as well as the policies of segregation that preceded it are often seen collectively as a main 
cause of black poverty. Yet, without suggesting that segregationist policies did not contribute to black 
poverty, it is argued here that there are other underlying reasons for the magnitude of black poverty today. 
Similarly to the poor white problem, black poverty is caused by a mix of exogenous and endogenous 
factors, including historical factors, education, discriminatory labour policies, shifting demographic trends, 
language, culture and, of course, politics. This section investigates the causes of both the poor white 
problem and black poverty today, and identifies the links between the two periods. 
 
Education 
An important cause of poverty in both periods can be found in the poor educational attainment (or 
insufficient accumulation of human capital) of the poor. Lewis (1973:13), for example, notes that a lack of 
proper education is the one factor that was emphasized by all the poor white commissions including the 
Carnegie Commission. 
 
Education policy amongst white settlers was founded in the doctrine of Protestantism, which emphasised 
the  salvation  of  individuals  by  faith  through  knowledge  of  the  Bible  (Malherbe,  Book  III,  1932:14). 
Therefore, in order to study the Bible, both the Cape settlers and the trekboere had relatively high rates of 
literacy. The basic education provided by parents had only one goal: to allow children to become members 
of the church and therefore be eligible for marriage. The education was therefore primarily religious and 
conservative, exacerbated by the conservatism of the people themselves (Lewis, 1973:14).10 Yet, these 
educational practices did not keep abreast of the shifting economic and political trends of the times. Such 
conservatism assumed that what worked best in the past, must also be best for the future. The opening of 
the interior, accompanied by sharp urbanisation in the areas surrounding the diamond and gold mines, 
caught many of the whites unaware and rendered the simple past educational practices insufficient. 
  
To address the issue of education, the state established missionary schools in 1841 (Malherbe, Book III, 
1932:38). These schools were attended by black, coloured and white students, although some schools 
catered exclusively for white students. Teachers came from England and brought with them new teaching 
methods and content. However, the requirement that all education be in High Dutch until 1910 did not 
help in the cause of furthering young South Africans’ education; High Dutch was almost as foreign to 
Afrikaner  children  as  to  English  (Lewis,  1973:15).  In  an  attempt  to  address  the  consequent  skills 
deficiency, the Cape Government established industrial schools to equip students with skills (much later 
for  whites than for blacks  and  coloureds); however, the  common  perception  was  that these schools 
tended to attract pupils with criminal tendencies and mental deficiencies (Lewis, 1973:15). Furthermore, 
many of these programmes did not reach rural areas. Education was seen as an irrelevant luxury to the 
rural population, not addressing the realities of their daily struggle for survival. According to Malherbe 
(1932:38), in a survey conducted by inspector-general Donald Ross in 1883, 55,4 per cent of the total 
white student population in school were in Standard I (Grade 3) or below. More than 80 per cent of 
students in rural areas were in Standard I or below. Only 1 per cent of students were above Standard IV, 
equivalent to today’s Grade 6 (Malherbe, Book III, 1932:38).  
 
The  conservative  lifestyles  and  views  about  education  limited  the  development  of  skilled  industry, 
primarily for the rural, white, Afrikaans-speaking population group - the group which would later also 
form the largest contingent of poor whites (Malherbe, 1932:ix). According to Lewis (1973:17), in addition 
to the low development level of industry, poor education also contributed to bad farming methods. Such 
techniques in part contributed to the severity of the droughts experienced in the late 19th century, as 
farmers did not have the knowledge to cultivate the farms in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, poor 
education also entailed widespread ignorance of health and other issues; when a certain Mr. Du Preez 
proposed a solution of tobacco, paraffin oil, resin and podaphyllin (wild mandrake root) as a cure for the 
1896 rinderpest, and President Kruger endorsed this remedy, chemists sold out of podaphyllin in weeks in 
spite of cattle still dying from the disease (Lewis, 1973:17). 
 
Black poverty today is partly a consequence of poor educational practices conducted during the preceding 
five decades. According to Fiske and Ladd (2004:52), four aspects of Apartheid were particularly pertinent 
                                                 
10 Lubbe (1942:69) notes that the education brought over by the English teachers (see later in text) was considered by 
the settlers as contradicting their cultural identity with the intent of denationalising them. for black education: residential segregation and persistent poverty among blacks, inadequate resources and 
low-quality instruction for black children, low levels of educational attainment among black adults, and the 
absence of a “culture of learning”. 
 
The  Black  Education  Act  of  1953  formalised  the  segregation  of  black  education  and  immediately 
worsened the situation in black schools (De Villiers, 1996:194). State spending on missionary schools, 
once the backbone of black education, ceased in 1957 in an attempt to gain ideological control over the 
black intelligentsia who were the product of a mission-based educations system (Marks and Trapido, 
1987:21). The increase in the numbers of black children attending school exacerbated the shortage of 
funding; in 1953 the student/teacher ratio was 40:1 in black schools and worsened to 60:1 by 1974. 
Furthermore, by 1974, only slightly more than 1 per cent of teachers in black schools had a relevant 
degree and professional qualification (De Villiers, 1996:194). 
 
Yet, the lack of funds was not the primary reason for the poor education of blacks. The government’s 
policy of separate development, a discriminatory initiative that began much earlier than the election of 
1948  and  was  promulgated  by  Dr.  Verwoerd  when  he  was  Minister  of  Native  Affairs  in  1954, 
subordinated  black  education  to  that  of  whites.  Dr.  Verwoerd,  the  founding  father  of  the  Grand 
Apartheid policy, emphasised that blacks should not be subjected to white education as this would only 
provide them with ideals which they could not pursue. 
 
From 1954 to 1968 black education was the responsibility of the Department of Native Affairs. After 
1968, black education was split between the education departments of the various homelands and the 
Department  of  Bantu  Affairs.  However,  dissatisfaction  with  the  poor  quality  of  education  and  the 
inadequate supply of resources available to students, boiled over into the Soweto uprising of 1976. The 
1976 Soweto uprising, which Terreblanche (2002:308) calls one of the most decisive events in South 
Africa’s political and economic history, was the result of a government stipulation earlier in 1976 that 
certain subjects in black schools had to be taught in Afrikaans, despite the fact that there were not enough 
teachers that could speak Afrikaans employed in these schools (Terreblanche, 2002:350). The stipulation 
resulted  in  an  illegal  march  by  thousands  of  school  children  in  Soweto  that  ended  violently  in 
confrontations with the police. The marchers demanded that the Black Education Act be abolished and 
insisted on equal per capita education expenditure by the government regardless of race or gender, equal 
access to education facilities, free and compulsory education for blacks, equal pay for all teachers and 
access for black students to all universities (Davies, 1984). De Villiers (1996:195) notes that after the 
Soweto uprisings, black education would never again be the same. Students became part of the political 
fight  against  Apartheid.  The  government  replaced  the  Black  Education  Act  with  the  Education  and 
Training Act in 1979, suspended the compulsory teaching of Afrikaans as third language in schools and 
increased expenditure on black schools considerably (De Villiers, 1996:195). 
 
Expenditure on black education continued to grow after 1994. However, education outcomes remain 
unequal (Van der Berg, 2001) because, in practice, little has changed for black students. Fiske and Ladd’s 
list (2004) is still relevant today: racial segregation remains evident while poverty persists among blacks, 
many former black schools have fewer resources than former white schools, and the quality of teaching 
differs quite significantly between former black and white schools. Two post-Apartheid surveys found that 
South African children performed amongst the worst in an international comparative study on math and 
science scores (Fiske and Ladd, 2004:57). The poor performance of formerly black schools with respect to 
delivering adequately educated workers to the job market, was historically and continues to be one of the 
main causes of poverty and unemployment. 
 
Demography and the environment 
Although claimed to be the cause of the poor white problem by many intelligentsia of the time, the 
rinderpest of 1896/97 and the Anglo-Boer war should rather be thought of as events that increased the 
pace at which white poverty became evident. The rinderpest was devastating to cattle farmers, killing close 
to a third of cattle in the Cape (Lewis, 1973:22) and half of cattle herds in the Transvaal (Giliomee, 
2004:270). Only two years later, the Anglo-Boer war and the accompanying British scorched-earth tactics 
severely affected agricultural production in the two Republics. According to Giliomee (2004:270), almost 
90  per  cent  of  homesteads  in  the  Free  State  were  burned  down,  while  crops  and  equipment  were 
destroyed. In the Transvaal, 80 per cent of the cattle, 75 per cent of the horses and 73 per cent of the sheep were killed (Giliomee, 2004:270). 11 More than 15 000 farmers did not return to their farms after the 
war. 
 
Although accelerating the process of rapid urbanisation, the events before the end of the 19th century 
played an even more central role in the urbanisation of a large part of the white population. According to 
Terreblanche (2002:264), mercantile intermediaries during the 1880s limited the ability of white farmers to 
develop modernised farming techniques. The chronic poverty of the farmers ensured their dependence on 
credit facilities and a lack of both working and investment capital; the farmers’ “mercantile ‘enslavement’ 
not only hampered the transition to commercial agriculture, but also helped to bankrupt smaller farmers 
on uneconomical units” (Terreblanche, 2002:265). Furthermore, during the 1870s, the role of the state in 
agriculture increased, to the detriment of the small farmer.  Consequently, many small farmers were 
reduced  to  bywoners  on  the  farms  of  wealthy  landowners  (Terreblanche,  2002:265).  Yet,  the  wealthy 
landowners, many of them Afrikaners, assisted in causing the decline of the small farmers by buying their 
land when bankruptcy threatened or providing loans that subjected the small farmer to life as a bywoner. 
 
These  factors,  coupled  with  poor  agricultural  practices,  poor  agricultural  land,  severe  droughts 
(exacerbated by the unsustainable agricultural practices) and an inappropriate cultural tradition (discussed 
later), caused what many called the second Great Trek – from the farms to the cities. The exodus of the 
rural poor was neatly summarised by Dr. Malan (1917:21) in 1917: “Alas, this trek does not lead from the 
narrows to the open spaces. This is a trek from a condition of freedom and abundance to one of poverty 
and want. This is the journey from Canaan to Egypt.” 
 
Yet Table 6 suggests that the exodus was not as large as once claimed. More accurately, the growth of the 
urban population was largely driven by immigrants entering the country, especially in the period following 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  Witwatersrand,  and  high  rural  fertility  rates.  According  to  Giliomee 
(2004:272),  between  1875  and  1904  more  than  400 000  immigrants  entered  South  Africa  -  a  greater 
number of people than those comprising the total white population in 1875. In fact, the growth in the 
rural population between the censuses, although smaller than the growth in the cities, suggests that the 












population  Total  % Urban  % Rural 
1891  217322  -  403297  -  620619  35.02%  64.98% 
1904  590926  171.91%  525880  30.40%  1116806  52.91%  47.09% 
1911  695796  17.75%  616446  17.22%  1276242  54.52%  48.30% 
1918  766894  10.22%  654932  6.24%  1421781  53.94%  46.06% 
1921  847508  10.51%  671980  2.60%  1519488  55.78%  44.22% 
1926  975235  15.07%  701425  4.38%  1676660  58.17%  41.83% 
Table 6: Extent of white urbanisation between 1891 and 1926 
Source: Lewis (1973:27) 
 
Growth in the urban population did, however, accelerate rapidly as people streamed into the cities in 
search of prosperity.  Many of the white immigrants to the cities were poor, unemployed and without 
skills. Urbanisation was much more severe for Afrikaners – while only 2 per cent of Afrikaners lived in 
cities in 1890 (close to 10 000), nearly half of all Afrikaners lived in cities by 1936 (approximately 535 000) 
(Giliomee, 2004:274). Giliomee (2004:274) calls the early urbanisation wave “fast, chaotic and a traumatic 
process”. Wages were low, jobs scarce and labour unorganised. The poor education of the urbanised 
Afrikaner contributed to their inability to find well-paying employment and to form labour unions. Many 
new arrivals from the farms had no contacts in the city and had to settle for a small room in one of the 
many shanty towns that sprang up, some of them considered to be the worst in the world (Giliomee, 
2004:274). According to Giliomee (2004:274), crime was rampant in these towns; for many years young 
Afrikaners found crime or prostitution to be their only means of survival. 
 
                                                 
11 According to Terreblanche (2002:245), 60 per cent of Afrikaner assets in the Transvaal and Free State were 
destroyed. The second period of urbanisation occurred in the early 1930s as the Great Depression of 1929 plunged 
the world into a recession and wide-spread droughts in early 1930s destroyed large parts of crops and 
herds. The government attempted to block the stampede to the cities by offering large loans to farmers. 
Although many politicians of the times had argued for a return of the Afrikaner to the farms (see Malan, 
1917),  practical  considerations  soon  prevailed;  the  government  greatly  expanded  its  support  to  the 
unemployed and provided employment in public works programmes (Giliomee, 2004:295). 
 
Although rapid urbanisation – accelerated by the rinderpest, Anglo-Boer war and later the droughts and 
the  Great  Depression  –  proved  to  be  a  cause  of  growing  white  poverty  in  the  cities,  it  probably 
contributed more to an increased awareness of the problem than to an increase in the number of those in 
absolute poverty in the country as a whole. Poor whites crowded together in shanty towns on the edges of 
cities presented a face to a problem hidden by the distances between farmers and their geographical 
isolation. 
 
Black urbanisation took a very different route. Influx control before 1948, then under the control of the 
municipalities, ensured that blacks could not take up residence in metropolitan areas, mostly due to the 
Stallard legislation of 1923 (Simkins, 1983:118). According to Gelderblom and Kok (1994:84), there were 
primarily two reasons for influx control. The first was that most employers (especially those in mining and 
agriculture) feared that urbanisation would lead to competition for black labour and thus an increase in 
wages for black workers. Secondly, there was a perceived link between a permanent presence of blacks in 
the cities and granting political rights to these individuals.  
 
Before  1948,  influx  control  varied  between  municipal  disctricts;  it  was  enforced  effectively  in 
Bloemfontein, less effectively in Cape Town and not at all in Johannesburg (Simkins, 1983:119). The 
Urban Areas Act of 1945 and Verwoerd’s 1952 Influx Control Act changed that. The Acts prescribed 
areas of residence for blacks and limited the numbers of blacks that could move to the cities. According to 
Simkins (1983:119), white farmers experienced an acute shortage of labourers in the post-War period, and 
were an important constituency when influx control legislation was designed. Although a surplus of farm 
labour appeared after the 1960s, influx control could not be abandoned as the government feared a rush 
to  the  cities,  with  the  accompanying  consequences  of  rapid  urbanisation.  The  Riekert  Commission 
proposed a process of “orderly urbanisation”, but by the 1970s the situation was already turning into a 
vicious cycle. The gap between urban and rural lifestyles was widening, which increased the desire of rural 
blacks to move to the cities (Simkins, 1983:119). To suppress this movement, the government had to 
enforce stricter influx control with heavier penalties. This in turn widened the gap even further. 
 
Because blacks could not purchase residential land in urban areas, large settlements developed on the 
outskirts of metropolitan areas. By the 1940s, squatter camps of around 63 000 to 92 500 blacks had 
settled in the vicinity of Johannesburg (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994:89). Although these settlements were 
demolished during the fifties, the government offered very few alternatives to blacks and did not make 
enough land available to them for proper development. Although the government did undertake large 
developments including Soweto and Alexandria, houses in these townships were only for rent, in line with 
the policy of temporariness (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994:90). Accordingly, the 1980 Population Census 
spells out the relatively low level of urbanisation of the black population. The Census found that 88 per 
cent of whites, 91 per cent of coloureds, 77 per cent of Indians and only 32.6 per cent of blacks had taken 
up residence in urban and metropolitan areas (Simkins 1983:119). 
 
By the 1980s it became clear that the government policy of temporary residence would not withstand 
growing social pressures. The rapid growth in the urban population – as a result of high fertility rates and 
illegal immigration – brought rising dissatisfaction with Apartheid policies to a head. It was estimated that 
every four-roomed house in Soweto provided housing for more than 14 people (Gelderblom and Kok, 
1994:90). Poverty in these townships was severe. A wave of protests during the 1970s and 1980s finally 
culminated in the decision to scrap influx control in 1986. According to Gelderblom and Kok (1994:91), a 
less stringent policy applied to black urbanisation after 1986. More land was made available to blacks, 
informal settlements were allowed and attempts were made to upgrade the latter. 
 
Language and Culture 
At the end of the 19th century, the majority of poor whites were Afrikaner farmers. According to Wilcocks 
(Book II, 1932:viii), the poor white problem originated in the old, established part of the white population, mainly  farmers  of  Dutch-French-German  origin.    However,  a  small  number  of  established  English 
farmers – mostly of British or Irish descent – were also poor. Wilcocks (Book II, 1932:viii) argues that the 
economic deterioration of these farmers was mostly due to their inability to adapt to the new economic 
order brought about by the discovery of diamonds and gold, the influx of European immigrants, and the 
speedy construction of the railroads to the interior. For many generations these farmers were isolated 
from interaction with new technologies, influences or ideas, and had stagnated into a pioneer life of 
subsistence and simplicity. The older white population was therefore confronted with unknown challenges 
in a society dominated by English leadership. 
 
It was no surprise then that the poor language ability of the urbanising white Afrikaners reduced their 
chances of finding employment. Most of them could not speak, read or write any English, probably due 
both to their poor education and reluctance to learn the language. Malherbe (1925:13) noted this too when 
he wrote: “(E)ducation proved insufficient as a prophylaxis against economic deterioration during a period 
of difficult adaptation”. Yet, the language of trade and commerce was English, with many of the business 
owners and artisans having come to South Africa during the gold rush. A large part of the urbanising 
white population was therefore unable to find work in the formal sector of the economy, and were forced 
into a life of poorly paid manual labour or unemployment. 
 
Apart from the language barrier, the cultural tradition of the farmers was not conducive to successful 
commercial farming. The Roman Dutch Law of inheritance entitled every child to a portion of his father’s 
estate, even if these portions were insufficient for supporting a family. Consequently many successful 
farms, once divided, ended up overused and unsustainable as the source of a livelihood. The severe impact 
of the droughts was one consequence of the unsustainable farming methods used on many of these 
divided farms. 
 
Just as the isolation of the white farmers made rapid transition to the modern economy difficult, so too 
did the rural black population in South Africa find it difficult to become accustomed to new technologies 
and lifestyles. Early explorers and missionaries in the country noted the apparent rejection of new tools, 
products and skills by the indigenous population, except for the use of tobacco and alcohol. Diamond 
(2005) suggests that this rejection of all things modern is the fate of most societies developed in isolation; 
a conservative outlook on life ensured their survival for thousands of years through the rejection of new - 
and possibly disastrous - technologies or tools. 
 
In spite of this, by the end of the 19th century, the black population had acquired skills in the industrial 
sector  (before  the  institution  of  the  “colour  bar”,  some  performed  semi-skilled  and  skilled  work). 
However,  the  segregationist  and  discriminatory  policies  of  the  early  20th  century  soon  intervened, 
restricting residence for black workers in urban areas and forcing a return to life as subsistence farmers in 
the black reserves. Although urbanisation would arguably have occurred much earlier had it not been for 
the Apartheid policies, Gelderblom and Kok (1994:27) argue that the migrant labour system was not only 
the result of external compulsion but was also supported by the cultural tradition of the black population. 
Rather than promoting property rights, the men of the traditional Sotho-group were primarily farmers, 
moving seasonally to their fields that were scattered over a wide area (an appropriate strategy considering 
the inconsistent rainfall of the interior) (Feinstein, 2005:17). 
 
Furthermore, the poor education blacks received under the apartheid government ill-equipped them for a 
move to the cities after the abolition of influx control. Language formed an obstacle, as most of the 
formal sector was either English- or Afrikaans-speaking. The rural black traditional culture and lifestyle 
was in many respects different to the culture of the white population; for example, in rural areas black 
farmers made use of traditional communal land for grazing and herding while property rights ensured 
individual  ownership  in  the  white  economy.  Furthermore,  many  rural  blacks  settled  in  sprawling 
townships on the outskirts of large cities where intolerable living conditions have often persisted to this 
day. Their poor living conditions and weak educational background did little to assist them in finding 
employment in the formal sector, so many were forced into a life of underemployment or unemployment. 
 
Labour and government policies 
The first government of the Union in 1910 under General Louis Botha and later General J.C. Smuts 
followed a market-oriented approach. According to Giliomee (2004:276-277), during his years of studying 
at Cambridge, Smuts was influenced by Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890), which argued for little government intervention in the economy.  12 According to the classical approach, government is 
unable  to  alleviate  poverty,  and  only  the  free  market  mechanism  (including  low  import  tariffs  and 
balanced budgets) can rectify the situation; the best government can do is to provide education for the 
next generation. Therefore, Smuts aimed at high economic growth rates as the only viable way to improve 
the  welfare  of  society.  His  approach  was  succeeded  by  Hertzog’s  approach,  which  emphasised 
government intervention as an important tool in alleviating poverty. According to C.M. van den Heever, 
Hertzog’s  biographer,  Hertzog  was  more  continental  as  he  rejected  a  purely  laissez  faire  approach 
(Giliomee, 2004:277). The different political ideologies had profound implications for the types of policies 
applied by the two governments. 
 
A distinction needs to be made between government policies that contributed to poverty and those that 
attempted to alleviate it. Government policies at the start of the 20th century were primarily concerned 
with labour issues: 13 providing cheap labour to the mining industries and gaining political support from 
the growing white, urban working class. Of course, these two aims were mutually exclusive; cheap labour 
could be provided by blacks rather than whites, but reducing white jobs (and particularly from skilled 
positions) was politically unfeasible.  
 
To  find  a  safe  middle-ground,  the  government  invented  the  policy  of  segregation.  According  to 
Terreblanche (2002:254), a segregationist policy was already proposed by Milner and his Kindergarten (a 
group of Oxford graduates) in the SANAC report of 1905. 14 It hoped to solve the labour problems of the 
mines - while accommodating white racism - by creating “native reserves” that were too small to sustain 
the black population and thus created a “reservoir” for migrant labour (Terreblanche, 2002:255). The 
report furthermore proposed the segregation of whites and blacks in cities and in politics, where whites 
were supposed to represent the grievances of blacks. This was followed by the Land Act of 1913, which 
succeeded in creating a large reservoir of cheap and docile black labour, and in 1923 by the Native (Urban 
Areas) Act aimed at controlling the influx and urbanisation of black workers to the cities. 
 
According to Beinhart and Dubow (1995:7-8), the racist segregation policies of the early 20th century 
should be understood as rationalising economic and capitalistic imperatives. While these (SANAC report, 
Land Act, Native Act) repressive labour laws were institutionalised on behalf of the mainly English-
speaking white capitalist class (and lowered their costs), the discriminatory measures were institutionalised 
mainly on behalf of the Afrikaner proletariat or working class (which increased the costs for capital) 
(Terreblanche, 2002:270). According to Terreblanche (2002:270), it is not surprising to note that most of 
the repressive labour laws were institutionalised during the period of South African Party government 
from  1910  to  1924  (Botha  and  Smuts  supported  by  the  English  capitalist  class),  while  most  of  the 
discriminatory laws – introduced in part to alleviate white poverty – were institutionalised during the Pact 
government of Hertzog after 1924. 
 
The  steady  decline  in  the  gold  mines’  profits  between  1910  and  1920  and  the  increase  in  the  wage 
differential between white and black workers from 11.7:1 in 1911 to 15:1 in 1920 caused the mine houses 
to announce plans to employ fewer white workers (and to lower the colour bar to allow black workers to 
perform  semi-skilled  work)  (Terreblanche,  2002:270).  These  changes  triggered  protests  by  white 
mineworkers (mainly poor white Afrikaners) under a Red Flag with the slogan: “Workers of the world 
unite and fight for a white South Africa”. Smuts reacted by issuing the South African air force to suppress 
the strike, resulting in more than 200 casualties. Four leaders of the rebellion were sentenced to death and 
                                                 
12 There is little evidence to show that Marshall did, in fact, influence Smuts. In later years, for example, through 
their mutual involvement in Cambridge, Smuts became great friends with John Maynard Keynes, a major proponent 
of state intervention to stabilise the economy. They exchanged numerous letters which are published in the Smuts 
papers (1966-1973) 
13 Not all government policies concerned labour. The opening up of the interior and the discovery of diamonds and 
gold created a large market for locally produced crops. Yet, because of the openness of free trade and the poor 
infrastructure in the interior (making it difficult for farmers to get their goods to the market), cheap maize imports 
from the United States proved to be a serious problem for local farmers. These farmers protested vehemently for 
instituting import restrictions to protect local production. They argued that the cheap imports caused farmers to lose 
market  share,  lowering  profits  and  increasing  poverty.  Therefore,  a  lack  of  government  policies  could  also  be 
considered a cause of poverty. (Of course, general equilibrium analysis might suggest that the benefits of the cheap 
maize in the cities outweighed the cost to the farmers.) 
14 In fact, Cecil John Rhodes’ Glen Grey Act of 1894 was a prelude to this and later Acts that discriminated against 
blacks. walked to the gallows singing the Red Flag (Feinstein, 2005:81). According to Terreblanche (2002:270), 
the harsh suppression of the strike “featured prominently in the consciousness of the Afrikaner working 
class” and played an important role in the election win of the Pact government in 1924.  
 
The victory of Hertzog’s Pact government (the National Party and the Labour Party) in 1924 brought 
about a change in the emphasis of government policies, from focusing on the needs of the capitalist class 
to the needs of the working class – specifically white poverty alleviation. According to Feinstein (2005:86), 
the Pact government again interfered with the normal operation of market forces; whereas the previous 
government focused on suppressing the wages of black workers, the Pact government attempted to raise 
white  wages  while  suppressing  black  wages.  The  new government  immediately  sprang  into  action:  it 
introduced a discriminatory policy officially dubbed “civilized labour” by adopting the Wage Act in 1925, 
the Mines and Works Amendment Act in 1926 and the Native Administrative Act in 1927. The Wage Act 
gave the minister the right to appoint a wage board and to prescribe the same minimum wages for blacks 
and whites. The Mines and Works Amendment Act reintroduced the “colour bar” in favour of whites and 
coloured workers. Whereas the Supreme Court had ruled in 1923 that the previous “colour bar” was ultra 
vires, the new Act simply reserved certificates of competency in skilled trades for whites and coloureds 
(Terreblanche, 2002:273). This institutionalised a type of affirmative action; because blacks were restricted 
to do unskilled labour, mines had no option but to employ white labour even though blacks might have 
been more productive. According to Terreblanche (2002:273), between 1924 and 1933 more than 8000 
jobs were transferred from black to white workers. 
 
Apart from the labour laws, the new Pact government also implemented a new industrial policy since it 
considered the availability of cheap electricity and steel to be necessary preconditions for the development 
of a manufacturing industry (Giliomee, 2004:290). Accordingly, ESCOM was established in 1922 and 
ISCOR in 1928 (with production beginning in 1933). Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the country’s 
infrastructure, especially the railways, required builders and operators. Table 7 shows the rapid increase in 












construction  Total 
1924  3083    1667    4750 
1925  7557  145.12%  3193  91.54%  10750 
1926  10161  34.46%  3126  -2.10%  13287 
1927  11228  10.50%  3624  15.93%  14852 
1928  11997  6.85%  3901  7.64%  15898 
1929  12906  7.58%  2912  -25.35%  15818 
1930  12501  -3.14%  1862  -36.06%  14363 
1931  12247  -2.03%  2304  23.74%  14551 
Table 7: White labourers on the railways15 
Source: Wilcocks (Book II, 1932:79) 
 
Part of the industrialisation process involved the high tariff structure that was imposed to protect local 
industries. According to Terreblanche (2002:274), rather than stimulating new industrialisation, the high 
tariffs succeeded only in protecting those industries that used mainly white labour. Government contracts 
also favoured those industries that employed predominantly white labour. 
 
While many whites argued that the Pact government policies succeeded in alleviating white poverty, this 
was  not  the  case  in  reality.  Terreblanche  (2002:274)  argues  that  “although  many  poor  whites  were 
employed ‘artificially’ at the cost of blacks, the Pact strategy did not succeed in solving the poor white 
unemployment problem. This only happened after the sharp increase in the price of gold in 1932, the 
enlistment of Afrikaners in the South African forces that participated in World War 2, and the creation of 
many additional jobs in the industrial sector during the War”. The Carnegie investigation undertaken in 
1929 and the 1934 National Conference on the poor white problem both suggest that poverty levels fell 
little after the first decade of Pact government. 
                                                 
15 Although not entirely similar, information presented in a speech by the Commissioner of the Railway Council in 
1934 closely resembles the same trend (Kuit in Du Toit 1934:51).  
By 1934 the poor white problem had become very sensitive politically.16 A conference to discuss possible 
solutions was called for and held in Kimberley in October of that year. A wide variety of speakers, both 
English and Afrikaans, proposed solutions to alleviating white poverty, none more important than those 
proposed  by  a  young  Prof  H.F.  Verwoerd,  then  professor  in  sociology  at  Stellenbosch  University. 
Although he acknowledged that white poverty could not be addressed without recognising the impact of 
various  policies  and  interventions  on  the  other  race  groups,  he  argued  that  “when  there  is  certain 
discrimination in the interest of the white worker, it should be remembered that such discrimination is not 
only in the interest of the poor white, but in the interest of the country!” (Joubert, 1982:55). And later in 
his speech: “There is valid reason for such temporary discrimination in some circumstances, as it will be in the 
interest of the country. However, this is the only way to sympathetically account for the welfare of both 
the whites and non-whites, even if it does carry with it the resemblance of prejudice” (Joubert, 1982:56, 
my emphasis). Verwoerd’s main proposal at the conference was the establishment of a Department of 
Social Welfare to coordinate and micro-manage poverty alleviation strategies of all branches of society. 
After the conference, and in charge of implementing the conference proposals, Verwoerd was critical 
about slow government action (Giliomee, 2004:302). He and others, especially D.F. Malan, used this 
inaction by government and the commemoration of the Great Trek in 1938 as the springboards for a 
successful campaign to increase nationalist feeling among Afrikaners, which contributed to the election 
win of the National Party in 1948. 
 
Although the “colour bar”, which reserved certain occupation for whites, had already been introduced 
early in the 20th century, discrimination was greatly extended after the National Party came to power in 
1948.  The  Native  Labour  (Settlement  of  Disputes)  Act  of  1953  excluded  blacks  from  the  term 
“employee”. The Act further restricted blacks from organising strikes and although not prohibiting black 
trade unions it denied them official recognition (Feinstein, 2005:157). The 1951 Native Building Workers 
Act prohibited blacks from undertaking skilled building work outside the demarcated black living areas, 
while  the  1956  Industrial  Conciliation  Act  and  later  amendments  reserved  almost  all  skilled  and 
increasingly semi-skilled  jobs for  whites. Because  of these  labour  laws,  a shortage  of skilled  workers 
already developed around the 1960s.  However, official policy remained committed to the policies of job 
segmentation  until  the  Wiehahn  Commission  recommended  in  1977  that  blacks  be  included  in  the 
definition of “employee” of the Industrial Conciliation Act (Feinstein 2005:241). By 1984, and with the 
rise of black trade unions, all job reservations had been abolished, with the exception of those in the 
mining industry, where they remained in place until 1988. Although white wages had been significantly 
above black wages for decades, the gap started to close in the 1970s because of the shortage of labour. 
Yet, Feinstein (2005:230) notes that black wages began to rise at the same time as labour supply began to 
outstrip labour demand. Real black wages rose by more than 40 per cent between 1970 and 1976, and the 
gap continued to close after that (Feinstein, 2005:231). 
 
The ANC-led government elected to victory in the first democratic elections of 1994 chose to follow what 
is sometimes referred to as a neo-liberal democratic capitalism approach. In essence, the ANC shifted gear 
from proclaiming socialist and communist policies before the election to opening up the economy and 
promoting free enterprise and economic growth as the main vehicles of poverty alleviation. The Growth, 
Employment  and  Redistribution  (GEAR)  programme,  released  in  1996,  captured  the  government’s 
commitment to economic growth through trade liberalisation, privatisation and macro-economic stability. 
Although it did not achieve the high growth rates it aimed for, it did succeed in stabilising government 
debt, bringing down the budget deficit and opening up the economy. Despite this emphasis on correcting 
macroeconomic  imbalances,  the  government  also  shifted  spending  to  a  number  of  key  social  areas, 
including education, social welfare, housing and basic infrastructure services. A new initiative, ASGI-SA, 
which was launched in 2005 with the help of a group of international specialists, again highlighted the 
need for higher economic growth in the context of efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goal 
of halving poverty by 2015. 
 
The new constitution of 1996 also made provision for the introduction of legislation to address the racial 
imbalances of the past. This culminated in the implementation of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 
                                                 
16 Primarily two reasons can account for this sensitivity. First, the Carnegie-report released in 1932 emphasised the 
severity of the poor white problem. Secondly, D.F. Malan split from the coalition of Smuts and Hertzog and formed 
the Purified National Party. The Party’s nationalistic propaganda emphasised injustices against the Afrikaners and the 
need to solve the poor white (Afrikaner) problem. Strategy for Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment, which later formed the basis for the Broad-
based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003). The BEE Act combines the Employment Equity, Skills 
Development and Preferential Procurement legislation into a comprehensive strategy to empower “all 
black people, including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas” 
(DTI Code of good practice: 2004). The policy, akin to Verwoerd’s policy of temporary discrimination, 
hopes to fast-track black economic revival. Although the reasons for introducing the BEE charter are 
evidently more nuanced, one should be skeptical regarding the ability of labour policies operating against 
market forces to benefit the majority of poor in the country. 
 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
 
Education 
During the beginning of the Second Carnegie investigation into poverty in South Africa, Le Roux (1984:1) 
noted that government attempts to address poverty in the 1980s should take cognisance of what was done 
to eliminate the poor white problem. This statement is as relevant today. 
 
An  important  contributor  to  the  alleviation  of  white  poverty  was  the  improvement  in  education. 
According to Malherbe (1925:401-411), between 1909 and 1920 school attendance for the total population 
increased  by  92  per  cent.  However,  Malherbe  (1925)  notes  that  this  increase  was  mainly  due  to 
compulsory  school  attendance  for  whites.  De  Villiers  (1996:191)  notes  that  in  the  first  decade  after 
unionisation in 1910, the number of teachers in the Union more than doubled. Even more important, 
argues  De  Villiers  (1996:191),  is  the  increase  in  the  number  of  teachers  in  possession  of  tertiary 
qualifications over the same period, from 59 per cent to between 73 and 80 per cent. These changes in 
education  were  primarily  brought  about  by  government’s  shifting  stance  on  education.  According  to 
Malherbe (1925), 26,4 per cent of government expenditure was dedicated to education in 1921/22, an 
exceptionally high percentage in those years. 
 
Any long-term strategy to improve the welfare of black households in South Africa will need to include a 
strategy for improving the quality of their education (Fiske and Ladd, 2004:12). However, as argued 
before, although government has attempted to improve education outcomes by increasing government 
expenditure  on  formerly  black  schools,  the  results  have  not  been  satisfactory.  Various  authors  have 
proposed a multitude of solutions to the problem. These include smaller pupil/teacher ratios (Case and 
Deaton, 1999), better qualified teachers, more resources and better school management. Unfortunately, 
there is presently little indication that these proposed solutions can be implemented. 
 
However,  important  practical  lessons  arise  from  the  success  achieved  in  addressing  the  poor  white 
problem in the 1930s. The first of the interventions to address the poor education of whites at the start of 
the century was to make education compulsory up to the current Grade 6 for whites in 1905 (Giliomee, 
2004:274).  Secondly,  higher  government  spending  on  teacher  salaries  ensured  that  higher  qualified 
teachers entered the school system. Thirdly, non-profit organisations and churches, in many cases funded 
by the state, played an important part in building institutional and infrastructural capacity in schools. The 
Dutch Reformed  Church  (DRC)  with  its  many  organisational  arms,  such  as  the  Afrikaanse  Christelike 
Vrouevereniging (ACVV), built and managed many industrial and agricultural schools between 1894 and 
1922 that provided education to more than 1500 students, as well as 160 boarding homes that served 
more than 7000 rural children between 1917 and 1932 (Giliomee, 2004:274). 
 
Education is now compulsory for all South Africans up to Grade 9. More recently, government has 
showed  its  commitment  to  improving  teacher  quality  by  signing  the  Improved  Career  Pathing  and 
Accelerated Salary Progression agreement, whereby teacher salaries are substantially raised. The quality of 
education received by blacks today still fallss far short of that received by poor  Furthermore, little is being 
done to address the shortage of institutional capacity at the micro-level. This is possibly an area where 
non-profit organisations can play an important role in addressing issues such as school security, offering 
training for science and math teachers, providing management and consulting services, encouraging the 
exchange  of  teachers  between  schools,  and  providing  boarding  facilities  and  financial  assistance  to 
students from poor backgrounds. 
 
Urbanisation The urbanisation of the poor whites and the poor black in the respective periods took divergent paths. 
Migrant labour played no role in the case of the poor whites –poor farmers sold or abandoned their 
holdings (mostly to wealthier farmers), moved to the cities with their families and started a new life. By 
contrast, rural black families usually remained on subsistence farms in the black reserves, with the men 
migrating to the city to find employment. Government projects to alleviate the poverty in the townships 
of the 1930s proved successful, whereas attempts to address the urbanisation of black workers - by 
building townships where houses could be rented from the government - did little to alleviate the plight of 
the poor. 
 
The major difference is that urbanised whites could purchase and own land in the city, whereas the 
migrant black worker could not, as residence was seen as temporary. Ownership brings many benefits, 
including access to credit facilities, better living conditions and incentives for further improvement and 
maintenance of the residence. According to Gelderblom and Kok (1994:92), the availability and security 
of land for the urbanising poor was the main difference between the increase in income for the poor white 
and the persistence of black poverty today. To address black poverty today, a rapid process of property 
right allocation should be undertaken in urban areas, especially in settlements where the land is owned by 
the government17.  
 
Government policies 
The labour laws of the Hertzog government did little to alleviate long-term white poverty. Although 
affirmative action policies did force industries to hire more white workers and public works programmes 
increased  employment  for  whites,  these  strategies  did  not  succeed  in  reducing  white  poverty  in  any 
meaningful way. However, together with state welfare programmes, these policies did alleviate poverty for 
some of the poorest in the cities, by offering them the chance to earn a minimum income. According to 
Feinstein (2005:89), the economic interests of the white workers who could vote had triumphed over the 
economic interests of the country as a whole (since many other South Africans could not vote). Although 
the major contributor to lowering poverty levels was the high economic growth rate in South Africa over 
the period spanning 1932 to the end of the 1960s, which was driven predominantly by the rise in the gold 
price and greater protectionism as a result of the Second World War18, even higher economic growth was 
constrained by the need to accommodate the interests of the politically active white working class. Yet 
some  government  policies  during  the  early  20th  century  did  contribute  to  building  capacity  to  take 
advantage of the high economic growth in the decades after 1930. The improvement in education and 
health for the poorest of the poor improved the trickle-down effect of economic growth to these groups: 
an important lesson for policy makers in contemporary South Africa. 
 
More than a decade after the first democratic election, analysts have begun to assess the success or failure 
of the post-Apartheid approach. According to Van der Berg et al. (2005:22), although the trend in poverty 
immediately following the transition is not that clear, recent evidence suggests that poverty has been on 
the decline.  
 
  1993  2000  2004 
Using poverty line of R3000 per capita per year 
Headcount ratio (P0)  0.406  0.413  0.332 
Poverty gap ratio (P1)  0.200  0.205  0.146 
Squared poverty gap ratio (P2)  0.126  0.127  0.085 
Number of poor (million)  16.2  18.5  15.4 
Number of non-poor (million)  23.7  26.2  31.0 
Table 8: Poverty indicators for total population post-1994 
Source: Van der Berg et al. (2005:17) 
 
Whereas poverty headcount numbers first increased after the 1994 elections (Table 8), the trend reversed 
after the turn of the century as the impact of poverty reduction strategies rose above the natural tendency 
                                                 
17 This is different from the process of land redistribution to blacks. Property right allocation refers to obtaining 
property rights to land where the holder already lives on the property. Land redistribution refers to obtaining 
property rights to land where the holder does not live on the property. 
18 For an extensive discussion of the growth period in these early years, see Fedderke and Simkins (2006) of an increase in the population to exacerbate poverty (Van der Berg et al. 2005:22). In particular, the 
rapid expansion of the social grant system since 2002 has been a very effective weapon in the fight against 
poverty.  Further, Van der Berg et al. (2005:22) argue, the income of blacks above the poverty line is rising 
considerably, with blacks now constituting half of the growth in the upper end of the consumer market. 
Although – as in the case of affirmative action for whites – BEE has contributed to the growing income 
levels of blacks in South Africa, BEE will not succeed in reducing black poverty altogether. Rapid job 
creation is the next hurdle, according to Van der Berg et al. (2005:23), as the social grant system is 
currently nearing the limits of its poverty alleviation capacity. For rapid job creation, a robustly growing 
economy is a necessity. The official growth goal set out in ASGI-SA suggests that the government is on 
the right track regarding its macroeconomic policy framework. 
 
The process of industrialisation during the 1930s was largely driven by the government, as evidenced by 
the establishment of first ESCOM, ISCOR and the Industrial Development Corporation in 1940. These 
institutions,  through  creating  additional  jobs,  contributed  to  the  development  of  technology  and 
investment in human capital. Furthermore, expansion of the infrastructure network (power and rail) was 
crucial in bringing down transaction costs of economic activity, enabling economic growth. Today, the 
government is aiming to privatise most of the state-owned enterprises in the economy. Yet, the experience 
of the 1930s should not escape the government’s attention. Investment in new areas of technology, rather 
than  simply  investing  in  job  creating  industries,  may  create  positive  spillovers  into  other  sectors  of 
production,  thereby  increasing  economic  growth.  The  current  government  is  in  the  process  of 
implementing an infrastructure development strategy (as found in ASGI-SA) as well as fine-tuning an 




There is little question that black poverty today is of a much greater magnitude and severity than white 
poverty  at  the  start  of  the  previous  century.  Although  both  periods  of  poverty  received  widespread 
political, social and economic attention, the poor white problem seems to have been mostly a case of an 
increase  in  relative  poverty.  Whereas  society  was  previously  more  equal  and  farmers’  isolation  made 
poverty less visible, the immigration of thousands of whites and the increase in wealth from the mines 
created for the first time a white underclass that was evidently poorer than the rest. Black poverty also 
concerns an increase in relative poverty; since the arrival of whites, black wealth was always subject to 
comparison with white wealth. However, the increase in white income levels, especially after 1930, caused 
white income to remain at far greater levels than those of blacks. Such inequality brought black poverty 
into the open, exacerbated by various discriminatory and repressive government policies. Although black 
poverty  has  started  to  decline  after  the  transition  (and  more  blacks  are  entering  the  middle-income 
groups), absolute black poverty is still much more severe than white poverty at the start of the previous 
century. 
 
White poverty – caused mainly by a poor education system and conservative culture of the isolated 
farmer, fast urbanisation after the discovery of mineral deposits in the interior and a number of exogenous 
factors such as the rinderpest, the Anglo-Boer war and many severe droughts – was alleviated in less than 
five  decades.  An  important  conclusion  from  the  investigation  into  white  poverty  is that  government 
labour and welfare policies contributed very little to the long-term alleviation of white poverty. High 
economic growth rates in the four decades after 1933 – and the accompanying increase in employment – 
were the most important factors in eradicating white poverty. Thus, economic growth is still the key to 
combating poverty. Black poverty, although on the political agenda for a number of years, is still severe. 
Although economic growth should be the main driving force of poverty reduction, the government can 
assist through poverty alleviation. Therefore, an understanding of the factors that contributed to the 
alleviation of white poverty is of critical relevance for modern poverty strategies.  
 
Firstly, this analysis suggests that improvements in education – through higher government spending but 
also improvement in teacher quality – can have a dramatic impact. Whereas the government has extended 
expenditure on education considerably since 1994, the quality of education – and especially the quality of 
outcomes – is not adequate. Private, non-profit organisations, such as churches and welfare organisations, 
can play a large role in improving the institutional and managerial capacity at the micro-level. Government 
emphasis and assistance to these organisations can create an awareness and community involvement that 
will go a long way to improving the outcomes of educational institutions.   
Secondly, differences in property rights held by the urbanised poor formed the main difference between 
white urbanisation and the attempted “orderly urbanisation” of the rural black. Property rights create 
numerous positive externalities, primarily through granting owners the opportunity to acquire capital, and 
extending those rights to those presently occupying but not owning property should be on the policy 
agenda of the current government. 
 
Thirdly, policies such as Black Economic Empowerment and the social welfare system will do little to 
alleviate  long-term  black  poverty.  Although  many  Afrikaner  nationalists  during  the  Apartheid  years 
claimed that the Afrikaners “saved themselves” from impoverishment, this is not entirely true. Afrikaner 
policies to promote Afrikaner interests did not improve the welfare of the white population to any great 
extent. This does not mean government should not intervene; government should implement policies that 
promote  economic  growth  or,  rather,  that  eliminate  the  binding  constraints  to  economic  growth. 
Infrastructure investment that combat market failures and reduce transaction costs should be such a 
policy  priority.  Furthermore,  the  South  African  government  can,  through  investments  in  new 
technologically  intensive  industries,  encourage  private  investment  that  makes  use  of  the  externalities 
created by these industries, akin to the government investment in ESCOM, ISCOR and the IDC in the 
1930s. Yet, the social welfare system has reached close to maximum capacity and, although it has evidently 
contributed to reducing severe poverty, it should not be considered the means to solving the problem of 
black poverty. Rather, the government’s focus on policies that promote higher economic growth and job 
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